
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The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #00156-89 27 February 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR:	National Foreign Intelligence Board Prince	cipals	
FROM:	Fritz W. Ermarth Chairman, National Intelligence Council		
	NIE 11-7/8-89: Soviet Aerodynamic Count Capabilities	erstealth and S	tealth 25X1
l. The attac Counterstealth an at the next NFIB	hed coordinated draft of NIE 11-7/8-89: d Stealth Capabilities is forwarded to yomeeting.	Soviet Aerodyn ou for consider	amic ation 25X1
Community, the dr referents. Any f	on to extensive coordination within the aft has benefitted from the expertise of urther suggestions for substantive change promptly forwarded to you through the NF	several outsid es or alternati	e ve
Secretariat.	Fritz W. Erman	General	25X1
Attachment As stated	,		
			25X1

25X1

25X1

e of Outside Consultants
We used several outside experts on stealth technology, who reviewed drafts deprovided comments that we made available to the principal drafter.
aracterization of the Coordination Meetings
Coordination meetings went smoothly, although major changes were made and ese required that the meetings spread over a several-month period. These anges expanded the text to the point that we split the paper in two. NFIB considering a relatively short NIE per se. The more detailed analyses that pport the NIE will be published concurrently in a Research Study. This tailed information is most useful to Department of Defense R&D and program nagers. There are a number of footnotes, mostly of a detailed nature and nce not calling into question the conclusions of the Estimate. A discussion denial, deception, and technology surprise, contained in a text box, has en included at the suggestion of then-DDCI Bob Gates.
scription of Significant Last Minute Changes
NONE
commendation for Standard or Limited Dissemination
Standard
ecommendation For or Against Issuance of White Cover Key Judgments

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SECRET

DCI TALKING POINTS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 11-7/8-89 SOVIET AERODYNAMIC COUNTERSTEALTH AND STEALTH CAPABILITIES

- o The Estimate was initiated by the NIO/S&T based on the high interest in the policymaking and R&D communities for intelligence on this important area.
- o It is needed to help US policymakers make decisions on the scope, pace, directions and funding of US <u>stealth</u> and <u>counterstealth</u> activities related to aircraft and cruise missiles.
- o The Estimate addresses two central questions: What are the Soviets' current and projected counterstealth capabilities against aircraft and cruise missiles? What are the Soviets' current and projected capabilities to develop and deploy stealth aircraft and cruise missiles of their own?

o For counterstealth, the Estimate concludes that the Soviets' capabilities will remain

	inadequate	25 X 1
	De activeving Signature reduction results comparable to those of the outled States.	25X1
0	This Estimate was managed by ANIO/S&T, will provide you with additional information.	STATI

BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE DCI'S USE ONLY

o The coordination meetings for this Estimate went smoothly, although there were major changes from earlier drafts

The new and more agree the length of the paper greatly, to the point that we

detailed CIA analysis expanded the length of the paper greatly, to the point that we decided to split it in two. NFIB is considering a relatively short NIE per se. The more detailed analyses that support the NIE will be published concurrently in a Research Study. This detailed information is most useful to Department of Defense R&D and program managers. A discussion of denial, deception, and technology surprise, contained in a text box, has been included at the suggestion of then-DDCI Bob Gates.

- o The only major disagreement noted in the draft relates to the characterization of the Soviets' counterstealth response to US stealth developments. Most agencies expect the Soviets to continue their evolutionary approach. But DIA and NSA expect to see a vigorous development on the part of the Soviets to close the gap in capabilities. DIA and NSA do, however, note that whether or not the Soviets will be successful in closing this gap remains to be seen.
- o Given the budget crunch in the Defense Department and the new openness regarding the B-2 stealth bomber and the F-117A stealth fighter, interest in this paper will be very high in both the Executive Branch and the Congress. Supporters may view the judgments regarding the Soviet shortfalls as vindication of continued and aggressive US development of stealth technology. Critics, on the other hand, may view the same judgments as a rationale to slow down these very expensive programs. As always, then, the potential exists for our judgments to be abused as well as used.

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